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Research biobanking raises numerous ethical questions.1 This article 
addresses the role that the concept of human dignity might play in 
ethical and legal reflections on the notion of informed consent in 
research biobanking. 
Though types of biobank vary,2 for the purposes of this article a 
biobank is defined as a collection of ‘samples of human body material 
or derivatives thereof from which genetic information can be derived 
and which are, or can be, associated with related information 
concerning the participants. A research biobank is a biobank used 
for scientific research purposes,’3 and is distinct, therefore, from a 
forensic biobank. We are concerned with research biobanks in the 
broadest sense of the term because, regardless of whether they are 
population biobanks, part of clinical trials, or formed by particular 
disease advocacy groups, they all raise similar issues regarding the 
notion of informed consent.4 
We first address why the concept of human dignity needs to be 
considered in the formulation of policy concerning consent in 
biobanking. Second, we briefly address why informed consent 
is a problem for biobanking. Third, we argue that a proper 
understanding of human dignity is necessarily multidimensional, 
so as to correspond with the multidimensionality of the human 
being whose worth the principle of human dignity is intended to 
affirm. Fourth, in light of such a multidimensional understanding, 
we will consider how human dignity may be appealed to by 
opponents of biobanking, followed by three examples of how it 
could be used to support three different kinds of consent that have 
been proposed as a solution to the problem of informed consent. 
Finally, we propose a solution based on a multidimensional 
understanding of human dignity that takes into account the 
diversity of the positions analysed. 
The importance of human dignity in 
biobanking
The formulation of policy concerning consent in biobanking needs 
to consider human dignity for at least two reasons.
First, the concept of human dignity has a prominent place in 
international codes governing the use of human tissue. Several 
prominent documents uphold the importance of respect for human 
dignity, e.g. the United Nations’ 1945 Charter, and 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights, and the 2003 International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data; and the 2009 OECD Guidelines 
for Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases. 
Second, in the South African context, the 2003 National Health 
Act states, ‘The State must, in compliance with section 7(2) 
of the Constitution, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, which is a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa.’ Health legislation must therefore 
take into account section 10 in the Bill of Rights, which states, 
‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.’
The problem of informed consent in 
biobanking
A closer look at the Constitution and the South African National 
Health Act of 2003 also reveals why an analysis of informed consent 
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is important, and why the concept poses a particular problem for 
research biobanks. Both the Constitution and the National Health Act 
affirm what is widely accepted as standard practice for the taking of 
human tissue samples, and the use of human beings and their tissue 
in research: the participant’s informed consent is required. Section 
12(2)c of the Bill of Rights states that persons are ‘not to be subjected 
to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent’. 
The National Health Act states in Chapter 9, section 71(1)b that, in 
research with human subjects, this requires ‘the written consent of 
the person after he or she has been informed of the objects of the 
research or experimentation and any possible positive or negative 
consequences on his or her health’. 
The problem for research biobanks revolves around precisely what 
it means to be informed. First, in research biobanking it is usually 
impossible to say what research the tissue or associated data will be 
used for. Second, while research biobanking seldom has immediate 
negative consequences for a person’s health, there may be other 
unforeseen negative consequences. 
This has led to a variety of approaches to consent in biobanking, 
with different approaches favoured in different contexts. While 
developed countries favour so-called broad consent, developing 
countries – shown in the analysis of South African law above – tend 
to favour specific consent.5 Before addressing the various consent 
regimes that have been proposed, we need to consider what is 
meant by human dignity. 
What does human dignity mean?
The concept of human dignity is not without its problems with regard 
to contemporary bioethics, and has been criticised on several fronts.6-9 
This pressure has led some agencies to move away from ‘dignity 
language’ in the formulation of ethical guidelines. For example, in 
Australia, the 2007 National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research10 specifically excised all earlier references to human dignity. 
Nevertheless, it still used the language of respect for persons, raising 
the question of whether avoiding the term ‘human dignity’ really 
solves the problem. 
We argue that for human dignity to be of value in ethical and legal 
discourse, it has to be understood as a multidimensional concept. 
The concept becomes problematic when it is reduced to one or other 
feature of the human person, for example autonomy, biological life, 
certain capacities, sense of self-worth, creation in the image of God 
or evolved superiority of the species, and so on. These reductions 
miss the point that human dignity refers to the worth of every human 
person, and the human person is multidimensional. The concept of 
human dignity must be likewise multidimensional.11 
An important part of this multidimensionality has to do with the 
philosophical observation that a human person both exists as a being 
per se, and as a being situated in historical time – in other words, as 
both an ontological and an existential reality. Consequently, human 
dignity is simultaneously (i) already and always present for all human 
beings as human beings; and (ii) not yet fully realised, as human 
beings are subject to the moral ambiguity of historical circumstances, 
in which they nonetheless seek to realise the fullness of their dignity. 
Human dignity is both ‘already’ and ‘not yet’. 
All human persons already have dignity because they possess 
a broad range of capacities, including not only the traditional 
notions of reason and free choice,12 but also emotion, affiliation, 
play, imagination, and so on.13 Regardless of their actual level of 
development, these capacities constitute an innate potential to 
live in a morally meaningful way14 within that person’s historically 
situated set of relationships.15
At the same time human persons, as meaning-seeking and meaning-
making beings, seek to realise this ‘potential’ by acquiring dignity. 
This acquired dignity can be equated with a conscious sense of self-
worth or pride,16 and is strongly associated with a worth attributed to 
them by their social group. In both cases, it is the result of what they 
believe to be their own morally good behaviour.
To respect human dignity, therefore, means to protect both our 
inherent potential and the realised sense of self-worth that results 
from the development and application of our capacities in moral 
behaviour. Only then do we truly respect the multidimensional 
uniqueness of every human person as a historically situated, 
meaning-making and meaning-seeking moral subject in relation to 
all that is. 
If we understand human dignity this way, then in terms of 
contemporary ethical and legal discourse it (i) prevents us from 
reducing ethics to the simplistic application of one-dimensional 
legalistic solutions, and (ii) encourages prudence and humility, by 
highlighting the tentative nature of both our individual behaviour 
and our collective mores (including laws) as, at best, well-intentioned 
attempts to realise the ultimately unattainable fullness of human 
dignity for ourselves and others. In other words, it invites us to 
proceed, but always with caution.
Human dignity and opposition to 
biobanking
Three features of biobanking might lead people to refuse to 
participate in it, or even to actively oppose it on grounds of human 
dignity. 
First, biobanking cannot say for certain what kinds of research may 
be conducted in future. Nor can it guarantee that the samples, 
associated information, or research results will never be used for 
malicious purposes. This means that participation in a biobank 
carries risks to a person’s dignity because it may lead to information 
or practices (e.g. genetic discrimination, breaches of confidentiality, 
damage to reputation) that place additional limits on a person’s 
potential to live a morally meaningful life.17
Second, biobanking deals with human tissue and, increasingly, 
human genetic material. A person may consider their genes to 
be an extremely intimate and integral part of their identity and 
dignity. For example, one may hold a religious belief that all 
human beings have dignity because they are created in the image 
of God and that therefore genes – as  containing that image – are 
sacred and should not be tampered with (this of course is not the 
only position that a belief in divine creation necessarily supports). 
For such people, genetic research in general is always an offence 
to dignity. 
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Alternatively, people may have no problem with genetic research 
per se, but feel that research into genetic diseases may perpetuate 
a certain ideal of the dignity of a healthy adult person, thereby 
undermining the inherent dignity that all human beings have, 
regardless of their genetic makeup. They may oppose biobanking as 
an act of solidarity, in the interests of upholding the dignity of those 
who have incurable genetic diseases or who will never have access to 
the benefits of the research.
Third, people may oppose biobanking because it constitutes a 
kind of commercialisation of human body parts. European law, for 
example, specifically condemns treating human tissue as property to 
be traded as a violation of human dignity, arguing that it should be 
considered ‘a gift’ to the common good.5,18 
Despite these objections, several possible solutions to the problem 
of informed consent in biobanking have also been suggested. What 
follows shows how each of these might be argued for on the basis of 
human dignity. 
Human dignity and presumed consent
Presumed consent applies where samples are banked for research 
because it is believed that the people from whom the samples were 
originally taken, e.g. for clinical purposes, would want this. It is usually 
accompanied by the right to opt out of the process.19 In Iceland, the 
deCODE biobank was constituted on this basis. 
A related practice is ‘collective consent’ where, in cultures 
characterised by strong group rather than individual identity, the 
consent of the group is sought via representatives.
In terms of human dignity, the case for presumed consent could be 
made as follows. Biobanking-facilitated research has the potential to 
significantly benefit portions of the population. Thus, participation is 
for the good of the dignity of everyone in the population, enhancing 
their chances of realising their inherent potential free of debilitating 
diseases. Moreover, since dignity is partly realised by living a morally 
meaningful life, it could be presumed that a person would want to 
contribute to the good of others, thereby enhancing their own sense 
of self-worth and public reputation as a morally good person.
Human dignity and broad consent
Broad consent is where the person supplying the sample signs a 
once-off consent to any research that may be performed using 
the sample and/or associated data, at the discretion of an ethics 
committee. The practical advantage of this type of consent is that it 
speeds up the research process. Here too there is usually an option 
for withdrawal at any stage.20 
From the perspective of dignity, the case for broad consent is 
similar to that for presumed consent, with the added dimension 
that it explicitly acknowledges the existential importance of being 
able to decide on morally meaningful matters for oneself. Since it 
acknowledges the individual as an autonomous person who would 
like to make informed choices on moral matters, especially insofar as 
these affect his or her own person, a broad consent should always be 
accompanied with sufficient information about what biobanking is, 
its uses, its risks, and so on. Though one cannot provide the specific 
information about what a particular individual’s sample will be used 
for, the idea of solidarity – a belief that one can contribute to the 
good of others – plays a role. Nonetheless, depending on the person’s 
belief regarding the implications of biobanks for dignity, they may 
also consider it an act of solidarity not to participate (see above).
Human dignity and specific consent
Specific consent means that a person should give consent for 
each use of their sample as and when the need arises. They should 
therefore also be adequately informed of each use to ensure that the 
sample is not used for research of which they would not approve.9
If presumed consent emphasises the principle of beneficence and 
hence the good of maximising the dignity-as-inherent-potential of 
human beings in general, then specific consent tends to emphasise 
the realised dignity of the autonomous individual above all else. As 
such, no ‘good cause’ can override the individual’s right to choose 
whether to support it, or to decide how to dispose of parts of their 
body. Ironically, this is the most restrictive position, in that it prohibits 
research without specific consent and therefore perhaps has more 
in common with those who reject biobanking as entirely immoral 
than with those who see it as force for good. In other words, specific 
consent very strongly defends the dignity of the human person 
insofar as this is realised in a person’s existential meaning-making 
and moral opinions, such that should a person be happy to support 
research into cancer but not into stem-cells, that choice should rest 
entirely with them. 
Human dignity as interpretive lens and 
normative vision
As seen above, human dignity is used to underpin a rejection of 
biobanking, a paternalistic presumed consent, a possibly legalistic 
broad consent, and a seemingly individualistic specific consent. 
The fact that it has been employed in different arguments does not, 
however, mean that it is useless.6 On the contrary, human dignity is 
very valuable as a concept that refers to the worth of every human 
being as a meaning-seeking and -giving, multidimensional, moral 
person embedded in a world in which disvalues are so ubiquitous 
that almost no moral behaviour can be perfectly good. 
A multidimensional understanding of human dignity that captures 
the multidimensionality of the human person enables one to affirm 
that all of the above ‘solutions’ to the consent issues in biobanking 
are, in their way, trying to do good and avoid evil. They all attempt 
to grapple with the problem that every ethics committee must face: 
respect and protect the dignity of research participants; and further 
the dignity of those who potentially benefit from the research.21 
These solutions all depend on the anthropological, philosophical and 
sometimes religious presuppositions of their proposers. Therefore, as 
much as all proposers might be trying to serve the normative vision 
of a world in which human dignity can be fully realised, they cannot 
be expected to come up with perfect, ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions. 
For this reason, a broad, multidimensional understanding of human 
dignity is vital in the day-to-day practice of biobanks. How people 
are shown respect can vary, but that they are shown respect, and feel 
that they have been shown respect, are vital.22 For some, this may 
mean not feeling compelled to participate; for others, being left 
alone after they have given their sample; or even feeling that they are 
actively participating in decisions regarding their samples and in the 
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ongoing successes of genetic research in general. All of these ways 
of engaging with biobanking will be existentially meaningful to the 
people who choose them. 
Therefore, human dignity, the worth of each individual, may best 
be respected by policies that accommodate as many of these 
positions as possible. There is no reason, for example, why people 
should not feel proud of contributing to biobanking, such that giving 
their consent is actually a formal expression of their commitment 
to the common good. The consent is required, but it is assumed 
it will be given. At the same time, there is no reason why people 
who are happy to commit their samples to the process, but who 
are unconcerned about the details and may indeed see repeated 
contacts as a nuisance,23 should not be allowed to sign a broad 
consent. Nor is there any reason, from the perspective of dignity, 
why people who want to give specific consent at every opportunity 
should not be able to. They may find this more ‘active’ participation 
to be particularly meaningful and even fulfilling,2 and may ultimately 
prove to be the best spokespeople for biobanking. Moreover, they 
may be more willing to link their biological data with biographical 
information, making them important for longitudinal studies.  
Finally, a multidimensional understanding of human dignity shows 
that sometimes the only solution is a compromise – albeit always 
with an awareness of the necessary gravity for those who may be 
compromised. Thus, though policy-makers may believe that biobanks 
may significantly benefit the public, they cannot make those who 
don’t believe this, believe it. At best, they can ensure that a person’s 
potential to live a meaningful life (his or her inherent dignity) is not 
compromised, and this should be done by, at the very least, making 
it possible to opt out.
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